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Superfund - Your Friendly Hometown Lender? The
Liability of Financial Institutions under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
INTRODUCTION

In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Act) and
appropriated badly needed funds in order to deal with growing problems
of hazardous waste.1 The Act made responsible parties, particularly those
who generate or transport hazardous waste, liable for cleanup costs.2
Courts which have interpreted the Act, however, have not only imposed
CERCLA liability on the apparent "responsible parties"3 but have, in
some instances, imposed liability on lending institutions which foreclosed
on contaminated property." Although the Act exempts from liability a
person who holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security
interest,' some courts have narrowly construed the exemption.' Thus, if
a bank forecloses on contaminated property, it may become liable for
cleanup costs.
Lenders need to be aware of the potential for liability when property
in which they hold a security interest is used for hazardous waste disposal or other similar activities. This comment examines the possible
liability faced by banks and other lending institutions for hazardous waste
cleanup under CERCLA. Following a discussion of CERCLA legislation
and case law impacting lenders, this comment makes several recommendations which lenders should consider when dealing with interests
in hazardous waste properties in order to reduce their exposure to liability.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 to 9675 (West
1983 & Supp. 1988)). See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprintedin 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,

6119, 6120.

2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607fa) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
3. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78
(D. Md. 1986).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) states:
"[O]wner or operator" means... (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control
of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person
who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
6. See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1569
(5th Cir. 1988).
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BACKGROUND

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently estimated that
American industries generate approximately 266 million metric tons of
hazardous waste each year. 7 That estimate is up from 150 million metric
tons in 1981.1 The average cost to clean up a single hazardous waste site
is now twelve million dollars. Projections indicate that cleanup costs will
grow substantially in the near future. 10
In 1980, Congress responded to the growing problem of hazardous
waste by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act." The purposes of the Act were to take control
of hazardous waste"2 by encouraging cleanup of abandoned hazardous14
waste sites," and to prevent further contamination of the environment.
Under CERCLA, parties responsible for production, transportation, and
storage of waste may be liable to the federal government, to a state agency,
or to private parties for the cleanup of waste."
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to target waste sites across the nation
through the development of a National Priority List (NPL).'1 Using the
NPL, the EPA prioritizes the sites according to the seriousness of the
hazard which they create,8 7 and thus determines the order in which the
sites will be cleaned up.'
7. Quentel, The Liability of FinancialInstitutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs
Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 140 (1988). Industry is not the only source of
hazardous waste. For example, during the 1930s and 1940s a University of Pennsylvania
professor, using the basement of his home in Lansdowne, Penn., to process radium, managed
to contaminate his own house and lawn, as well as the lawns of four other houses. When
the hazard was discovered in 1984, the EPA estimated cleanup costs to be in the neighborhood of two million dollars. The cleanup effort which began in 1984 using federal Superfund
money, however, continues today, but the estimated cost has jumped to over nine million
dollars. An estimated 2,200 tons of radioactive waste must be shipped to a hazardous waste
dump in Utah. Radioactivehouse cleanup will cost $9.5 million, Laramie Sunday Boomerang, Jan. 8, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
8. Quentel, supra note 7, at 140.
9. McMahon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,368 (1988).
10. Id
11. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, supra note 1.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, supra note 1.
13. Id at 6130-31.
14. Id at 6133.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). (Section also includes costs incurred
by Indian tribes.) 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1-4)(B) places liability for any necessary costs incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan. CERCLA defines a person as:
[Aln individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or interstate body.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West 1983 & Supp.
1988) (National Contingency Plan.
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
17. Id 40 C.F.R. § 300.66.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(c). 40 C.F.R. § 300.66-300.70.
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The Act originally created a trust fund,19 often referred to as the Superfund, 20 to be used specifically for the cleanup of hazardous waste.2' The
fund is largely subsidized by excise taxes levied upon the chemical and
petroleum industries. 2 In 1986 Congress amended CERCLA with the
23
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).
Among SARA's provisions was an $8.5 billion increase in the Superfund"
to allow for a more aggressive effort to combat the waste problem. 5
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to initiate cleanup of hazardous waste
if responsible parties refuse to do so. The three alternatives available to
the EPA include 1) issuing an administrative order, enforceable through
fines of up to $25,000 per day, directing a responsible party to implement
either removal or remedial action; 6 2) applying for an injunction in the
district court to compel the responsible party to clean up or abate the
release; 7 or 3) cleaning up the waste itself using Superfund money.2 8 If
the EPA cleans up the waste, the Act then requires the EPA to sue the
responsible parties in order to reimburse the fund.29
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it attempted to place the primary
responsibility for waste cleanup and its associated costs upon those who
created the problem.30 Although legislative history of the statute is incomplete and vague,3 1 courts have identified two essential purposes that Con19. Pub. L. No. 96-510, Title II, § 221, 94 Stat. 2801 (1980). Formerly 42 U.S.C.A. §
9631, repealed Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title V, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774 (1986).
20. Under current legislation the fund is labeled the "Hazardous Substance Superfund."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(11) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
21. Pub. L. No. 96-510, Title II, § 221, 94 Stat. 2801. Formerly 42 U.S.C.A. § 9631(b)(1),
repealed Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title V, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774.
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(p) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507 (West 1983
& Supp. 1988). See also Pub. L. No. 96-510, Title II, § 221. Formerly 42 U.S.C.A. § 9631(b)(2),
repealed Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title V, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774.
23. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615, 1652, 1692, 1774 (1986).
24. Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title 1, § 111, Title II, § 207(d), 100 Stat. 1642, 1706 (1986).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2836.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a)-(b) (West 1983 &Supp. 1988). See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 193 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Administrative authority
to remedy must vest early enough to prevent a potential hazard from materializing.).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a). See Conservation Chemical 619 F. Supp. at 192 (Congress
intended injunctive relief to issue whenever any aspect of the nation's interest in a clean
environment may be endangered.).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). The question of the extent of the
government's power here is currently unresolved. In OutboardMarine Corp. v.Thomas, the
court held CERCLA granted the government the right to enter a waste site to take remedial
actions necessary and to seek response costs from the responsible party. 610 F. Supp. 1234,
1985). The Seventh Circuit reversed this decision on the government's right
1239 (N.D. Ill.
to enter. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985). However, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's judgment and remanded the question
back to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration. 479 U.S. 1002 (1986).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
30. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, supra note 1, at 6136. The purpose of § 9607(a) is to "provide
a mechanism for prompt recoveries of monies expended for the costs ... from persons responsible therefore and to induce potentially liable persons to pursue appropriate environmental
response actions voluntarily."
31. Numerous courts have seen fit to comment upon the lack of legislative history. See,
e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040 (The court is without benefit of committee reports to

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 11
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

gress had in mind when enacting CERCLA
for the First Circuit explained:

2

Vol. XXIV

As the Court of Appeals

First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response
to the problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous
waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear
the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
they created."
Those who may be liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA include
34
(1) current owners and operators of a hazardous waste site or facility,
(2) those who owned or operated a site or facility at the time of waste disposal,3" (3) those who arrange for transportation, disposal, or treatment
of hazardous waste, 6 and (4) transporters of hazardous substances. 7 Thus,
any party who owns or operates a facility, as well as those who generate,
transport, treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste may be liable under
CERCLA.3 5
CERCLA liability is not necessarily based upon fault,3 9 but is
attributed to those who create or magnify the risks of hazardous waste. 0
Nor does the Act expressly make responsible parties strictly liable;
however, courts have interpreted the standard of liability, which is tied
to the Clean Water Act, 1 to impose strict liability 2 unless the party is
able to successfully assert one of the CERCLA defenses. 43 Responsible
determine the reason for compromise between Senate and House versions of the Act.); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)
(CERCLA's legislative history is "shrouded with mystery."); Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp.
at 578 (The legislative history is "sparse.").
32. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081; State ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp.
1531, 1534 (M.D. Penn. 1985).
33. Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). Courts have construed this language to include generators of hazardous wastes. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F.
Supp 1298, 1310 (E.D. Mo. 1987). See e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc. 578
F. Supp. 1249, 1252-57 (E.D. Ill. 1984) (Sections 9606 and 9607 construed together allow
liability to reach off-site generators.).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
38. Shore Realty, 752 F.2d at 1043.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a). See, e.g., Shore Realty, 752 F.2d at 1044 (Current owner of
facility liable when there is a release or threat of release).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1-4).
41. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). CERCLA states: "The terms
'liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability
which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32) (West 1983 & Supp.
1988). For standard of liability under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321, see, e.g., Burgess v. MIV Tamano,
564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. deniea 435 U.S. 941 (1978) (Owners of vessel discharging
oil are liable without fault to the government for cleanup costs.).
42. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042; Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1304 ("Liability under
CERCLA is strict, without regard to the liable party's fault or state of mind."). Id
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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parties are also jointly and severally liable." A party who is assessed costs
greater than his proportionate share may, however, seek contribution from
other responsible parties. 45 The amount of damages which the government
may recover from a private party is not limited,'6 and the costs may include
both "removal ' ' 47 and "remedial ' ' 48 action, as well as health assessment
costs, 49 and even up to $50 million for damages to natural resources."
In addition to liability for cleanup costs, a party may be fined for continuing violations of the Act.5 Violations of Class I Administrative Penal52
ties are punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 per violation. The fines
are imposed for violating sections of CERCLA relating to notice, destruction of records, failure to abide by the CERCLA financial responsibility
requirement, failure to abide by an order generated under a settlement
44. State of Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1487 (D. Colo. 1985).
45. Id at 1489; cf United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1230, 1234 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23) (West
1983 & Supp. 1988) states:
The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into
the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal
of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or
to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release....

Id

48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988) states:
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with
the permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in
the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances that
they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public
health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to,
such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter
protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup
of released hazardous substances or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse,
diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations,
repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff,
onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and
any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the
public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs
of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities
where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition
offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the
public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage,
treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and
associated contaminated materials.
2
Id
1983 & Supp. 1988).
(West
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4(D)
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607f)(West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
1988).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609 (West 1983 & Supp.
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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agreement, or failure to abide by administrative orders, consent decrees
or agreements. 3 Class II Administrative Penalties are imposed for the
same violations, but are punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 per day
for each day that a violation continues." Repeated Class I I violations are
punishable by a fine of up to $75,000 per day. 6
CERCLA provides only three defenses to those who are charged with
costs under the Act." The defenses include:
i) an act of God; or
(ii) an act of war; or,
(iii) an act or omission of a thirdparty other than an employee

or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs
in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant.. ., if the defendant establishes...
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances, ... and (b) he took precautionsagainst foreseeable acts
or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that

could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions... (emphasis added).,7
The first two defenses are rarely invoked by defendants in CERCLA
actions.58 The "third party" defense, however, provides the possibility for
relief in cases where no "contractual relationship" existed with the third
party alleged to be liable.5 9 The defense is available where the defendant
exercised "due care" with regard to the hazardous substance and took
precautions against any foreseeable acts or omissions by the third party.60
SARA added a "contractual relationship" definition to the third party
defense, thereby creating an "innocent landowner" exception within the
defense.6 ' The definition eliminates liability against landowners who
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a)(1)(A-E) and (b)(1-4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
55. This higher penalty is imposed for a second or subsequent violation. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9609(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(1-4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). Section 9607(b)(4) provides
for a defense using any combination of the other three defenses.
58. Defendants unsuccessfully asserted the "act of God" defense (42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(b)(1)) in U.S. v. Stringfellow, where defendants alleged that heavy rainfall caused contamination of a hazardous waste site. 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C. D. Cal. 1987). Apparently,
no defendant has asserted in court the "act of war" defense (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(2)).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(351(A) states:
The term "contractual relationship," for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of
this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the
facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal
or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or
more circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the
facility.
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acquired title to real property with hazardous substances located thereon
if they attempted to discover the waste before buying, but were nonetheless ignorant of its presence.62 To successfully assert the defense, the defendant must show that he "did not know and had no reason to know that
any hazardous substance... was disposed of on, in, or at the facility." 3
In order to prove that he "had no reason to know," the purchaser must
have undertaken "at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial and customary practice."' The section also provides that a court
shall take into consideration:
Any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and
the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection."
As is apparent, the "innocent landowner" provision offers little protection in the absence of an extensive investigation before purchase of the
property.66
In addition to CERCLA defenses, banks and other private parties may
take affirmative steps by bringing a private cause of action under
CERCLA prior to any governmentally authorized cleanup program. 67 In
a Ninth Circuit decision the California Department of Health informed
the owner of a site containing over one million metric tons of smelter slag
that he must clean up the site.6 8 The owner had just recently purchased
the site, however, and was not responsible for depositing the slag on the
property.66 After the owner spent $150,000 for testing to determine the
seriousness of the hazard, he brought an action against the former owner
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by
escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satisfied
the requirements of section 9607(b}(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) and § 9601(35)(B).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(351(B).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B).
66. Schwenke, An Overview of Issues of Landowner and Lender Liabilities,18 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,363 (1988).
67. CERCLA provides liability for: "[Any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (person defined). CERCLA contains no "citizen suit"
provision which would allow any person to bring suit. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). Instead, standing under CERCLA is based
on the private party spending money in responding to a hazardous waste problem. See Walls
v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1985).
68. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco., Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1986).
69. Id
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to recover his costs. 0 The owner also asked the court for a declaration
that, as between the two parties, the former owner was solely and entirely
liable under CERCLA for the cleanup.7' The plaintiff further requested
the court to order the former owner to initiate cleanup.72 After the district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a cause of action under
CERCLA, 73 the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the owner
could recover his costs from the former owner,"' and that the owner's claim
for declaratory relief was ripe even though the government had not authorized cleanup of the site.7" The court also found that the trial court could
properly order the former owner to begin cleanup.7
Bringing a private cause of action will not necessarily absolve a party
of all liability. However, it will perhaps identify responsible parties and
force initiation of the cleanup.
Among those who may be liable as "responsible parties" are "owners
and operators." Although CERCLA defines "owner and operator,"77 there
still appears to be some confusion as to who is or is not an "owner and
operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability. When Congress enacted
CERCLA, 78 its use of the terms "owners and operators"7 and "transporters"80 to define responsible parties, indicated its intent to place the costs
of cleaning up the environment upon those parties involved in the
hazardous waste industry." However, because of the rising costs of
hazardous waste cleanup, a new trend to apportion those costs over a
broad range of parties has emerged. 2 Congress, as well as some courts,
has expanded certain provisions of CERCLA to include others within the
scope of liable parties. SARA broadened the scope of liable parties to
include contractors, consultants, and real estate brokers." At least two
70. Id
71. Id. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part:
[Any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. The res judicata effect of the issue determination applies against the
government. Ma Chuck Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1002 (1957).
72. Wickland, 792 F.2d at 889.
73. ld

74. Id. at 893.
75. Id The issue was ripe for declaratory relief because the disposal of hazardous waste
had occurred, making the controversy real and not remote and hypothetical. Id. See Jones
v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Once some expenditure has been
made, the controversy is sufficiently real to permit the court to issue a declaratory judgment on the defendant's liability. A complete cleanup of the site is not required.).
76. Wickland, 792 F.2d at 893.
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
78. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 to 9675 (West
1983 & Supp. 1988)).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1).
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3).
81. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, supra note 1, at 6137.
82. Schwenke, supra note 66, at 10,362.
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A). Schwenke, supra note 66, at 10,362.
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recent court decisions may reflect a new trend by courts to find lending
institutions and other parties having very little contact with the hazardous
substances liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA. The courts have
accomplished this expansion of liability in part by interpreting "owner
and operator" broadly, and by construing CERCLA defenses narrowly,
particularly the security interest exemption. 5
LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER

CERCLA

Although lenders have faced liability under various theories, foreclosure and repurchase of a property at judicial sale alone, absent any exercise of control over the borrower, have generally been insufficient to impose
liability on lenders.8 6 However, a lender who exercises excessive control
over a borrower may become liable as a principal for the debtor's obligations.87 Lenders generally retain the right to make certain financial decisions by way of the loan agreement. 88 If a lender oversteps his bounds
while exercising those rights, his actions may be deemed control. 9 The
line distinguishing appropriate precautions from excessive control,
however, is not well defined. 8 Clearly, when a creditor takes over the business of a troubled borrower, making decisions typically left to the borrower, he crosses over the line and becomes liable as a principal.9 ' A
creditor who enters into a joint venture with a debtor may also be liable
as a principal. 2 Interfering with minor management decisions and other
less intrusive steps, however, lie somewhere in between.
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it recognized that lenders are sometimes inclined to participate in the control and management of a borrower,
84. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d 1569. See notes 162 to 172 and accompanying text. Maryland
Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573. See notes 136 to 161 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A). See, e.g., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,696 (D.S.C. 1984) (company found liable after holding title for one
hour).
86. E.g., Flintridge Station Assoc. v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434,
441-42 (7th Cir. 1984) (Lender justified in foreclosing, even though it expressed concern over
management of borrower). Lenders are, of course, required to follow statutory procedures
in foreclosure and repurchase. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-4-101, 34-4-113 (1977). See, e.g.,
Williams v. First Wyoming Bank, 742 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1989) (Foreclosure held valid when
notice of sale contained statutorily required items, despite imperfections). Lenders can face
liability for wrongful repossession and bad faith setoff. See generally A. CAPPELLO, LENDER
LIABILITY, at 79-87 (1987).
87. Cappello, supra note 86, at 148.
88. Id.

89. Id See, e.g., A. Gay Johnson Farms Co. v. Cargill Co., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981)
(Creditor kept books of debtor, controlled debtor's bank drafts and sent official to supervise
creditor's operations.).
90. Cappello, supra note 86, at 149-50.
91. In Re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. Minn. 1980) (creditor hired and
fired empolyees of debtor, controlled its mail, approved its contracts with third parties and
liquidated its assets); State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 678
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984) (Creditor controlled naming of debtor's board of directors and
officers.).
92. Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc., 291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1961) (Creditor
shared in profits from debtor's wholesale frozen food operation.).
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particularly if the borrower is having financial difficulty.93 CERCLA's definition of "owner-operator" exempts from liability "a person who, without
participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest.. .1"4 Consequently, lending institutions considered themselves beyond CERCLA liability as long
as they did not participate in the management and control of a hazardous
waste site, and as long as they held indicia of ownership only to protect
a security interest. The question that arises is, to what lengths may a
secured creditor go to protect its security interest before it becomes an
"owner or operator." If a bank forecloses on secured property and places
the high bid at the foreclosure sale, does it become an owner as defined
by CERCLA, or is it merely protecting its security interest?
One of the first cases to interpret the security interest exemption was
In Re TP.Long Chemica Inc.,95 a bankruptcy case. In Long Chemical,
BancOhio held a security interest in the debtor's equipment, fixtures,
inventory, and other personal property.96 The debtor, unbeknownst to the
bank, had buried drums of hazardous waste toward the back of the
property. 97 When the barrels were discovered, the EPA requested the
trustee in bankruptcy to clean up the waste. 9 After the trustee refused,
the EPA cleaned up the site with Superfund money." The EPA then sued
the trustee and BancOhio, which held a security interest in the debtor's
personal property.'00 Because the estate had insufficient assets to pay the
costs of cleanup, the EPA sought reimbursement from the trustee's funds,
which were subject to BancOhio's security interest. 01'
93. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, supra note 1, at 6181:
(A] financial institution which held title primarily to secure a loan but also
received tax benefits as the result of holding title would not be an "owner"
as long as it did not participate in the management or operation of the vessel
or facility.
Id

94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
95. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
96. Id at 280.
97. Id at 281.
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 282, The trustee argued that the barrels had been abandoned pursuant to
§ 554 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id at 284. However, the court held that the barrels could
not be abandoned. L at 286. Thus, the estate included the barrels when the EPA initiated
the cleanup. Id at 287. In a case similar to Long, the United States Supreme Court upheld
a bankruptcy court's denial of a trustee's abandonment power. MidAtlantic National Bank
v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986). The Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that the trustee's powers must yield to the governmental interest in public health and safety. 106 S. Ct. at 760. Thus, because of the "repeated congressional emphasis
on protecting the environment against toxic pollution," the trustee had a restricted power
of abandonment. Id at 762. The dissent would have allowed the trustee to abandon the contaminated property, arguing "the City and State are in a better position in every respect
than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." Id at 767 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting). The membership of the Court has changed since the Court issued this opinion.
Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion, has since retired from the Court. Thus, it is possible
that the Court in the future will adopt the view of the dissent.
101. 45 Bankr. at 287.
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The court rejected the EPA's argument that BancOhio had become
the owner of the barrels and should pay for the costs of cleanup. 102 The
court found instead that BancOhio fell within the security interest exemption.' 3 The bank had acted only to protect its security interest and was
not, therefore, responsible for cleanup costs incurred by the EPA.'04 The
court further noted that, "even if BancOhio had repossessed its collateral
pursuant to its security agreement, it would not be an 'owner or operator' as defined under CERCLA."'05
Shortly after Long Chemical, the question of ownership arose in the
6 the court
context of a foreclosure action. In United States v. Mirabile,"1
addressed the issue of whether a financial institution, by foreclosing on
a secured property, may become liable under CERCLA as an "owner."
In Mirabile, the American Bank and Trust Company (American Bank)
and the Mellon Bank (East)National Association (Mellon Bank) both held
security interests in the property of Turco Coatings, Inc., a paint manufacturing business. 07 American Bank foreclosed on the business and was the
high bidder at the foreclosure sale. 0 8 After foreclosure the bank secured
the property to prevent vandalism, showed the property to prospective
buyers, and shortly thereafter sold it to the Mirabiles.'" s Sometime later
the Mirabiles received notice from the State of Pennsylvania that leaking drums of toxic waste had to be removed from the property.10 The Mirabiles attempted to store the leaking drums but failed."' The EPA
eventually cleaned up the site at a cost of $250,000, and then sued the
Mirabiles for reimbursement. 1" 2 The Mirabiles joined the American Bank
and Mellon Bank as third party defendants. The Mirabiles claimed that
the banks acted in a management capacity while financing Turco and
thereby helped create the hazardous waste problem."'
The court granted American Bank's motion for summary judgment.
It found that even though the bank had foreclosed and purchased the
property before the Mirabiles took possession, it nevertheless was not liable under CERCLA." 4 The court ruled that the bank's actions were undertaken only to protect its security interest, and could not be deemed
participation in the management of the site."' The Mirabilecourt recognized that "in enacting CERCLA Congress manifested its intent to impose
102. Id at 288.
103. Id. at 289. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
104. 45 Bankr. at 289.
105. Id at 288-89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
106. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. )Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,993 (E.D. Penn. 1985) (Mirabile II).
107. Id at 20,995.
108. Id at 20,996.
109. Id
110. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,993 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (Mirabile I).
111. Id
112. Id
113. Mirabile II, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995.
114. Id at 20,996-97.
115. Id. at 20,996.
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liability upon those who were responsible for and profited from improper
disposal practices.' 1 6 The court found that "the exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor does not become overly entangled
in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may
not be liable for cleanup costs.""' 7 The court explained that the distinction between participation in purely financial aspects of the operation,
as opposed to participation in management of the facility or business itself,
is "critical."'" 6 "Mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices
of the sort possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not... sufficient for the imposition of liability.""' The court adopted the defendant's
argument, finding that "a secured creditor's exercise of financial control
over the debtor should not bring the creditor within the scope of CERCLA
liability. ' 12 0 The court also noted that:
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending
institutions would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact that owners and operators
of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, defunct, or otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that imposition of such liability would help to ensure more responsible management of such
sites. The consideration of such policy matters, and the decision
as to the imposition of such liability, however, lies with Congress.
In enacting CERCLA Congress singled out secured creditors
for
2
protection from liability under certain circumstances.1 '
Although the American Bank in Mirabile foreclosed on the hazardous
waste property, it did so, as the court found, only to protect its security
23
interest.'2 2 Therefore, American Bank was not liable for the cleanup.
The court did not come to the same conclusion with regard to Mellon
Bank.'" The court found that Mellon Bank's predecessor had participated
in the management and control of Turco.' 2' The evidence indicated that
a former bank officer had joined an advisory board to oversee the Turco
operation, and had in fact been involved in the day to day operations of
the plant. 26 Furthermore, the loan officer had made weekly visits to the
site. 27 In light of the evidence, the court held that there was a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Mellon Bank had exercised enough
control over
12
the operations of Turco to bring it within CERCLA.'
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id

Id at 20,995.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 20,996.
at 20,997.
at 20,996-97.
at 20,997.

Id
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The Mirabile decision illustrates at least one method by which lending institutions may become liable under CERCLA.2 9 The security exemption is to no avail if the lender participates in the management or control
of the facility. 13 1 If the lender becomes involved in the affairs and operations of the3facility, he may then fall within the definition of "owner and
operator.'

The second way in which a lender may become liable under CERCLA
is by foreclosing on property which is subject to a security agreement.'
Although the language of the Act exempts from liability lenders who institute action "primarily to protect [their] security interest, ... ,,133 not all
courts agree upon the application of the exemption.' The Mirabile court
found the American Bank to come within the security exemption after
it foreclosed and held legal title to the property. 3

-

A 1986 decision,

however, concluded that a lender may become liable as an "owner" after
foreclosing on a secured property.
In United States v. MarylandBank and Trust,36 the Maryland Bank

and Trust (MB&T) loaned money to Herschel McLeod to operate a trash
and garbage business."' McLeod permitted hazardous chemicals to be
disposed of on the property. 3 8 Although the bank knew the general nature
of the business, whether the bank knew of the contamination was disputed
at trial.'39 In 1980 MB&T loaned Mark McLeod money to purchase the
business from his parents. 40 Not long after the sale the younger McLeod
failed to make payments on the loan and the bank foreclosed on the business.' MB&T then purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. 4 2 The
EPA later told the bank of the hazardous waste on the property and
requested that MB&T clean up the site."" After the bank refused to clean
up the waste the EPA did so.'" It removed 237 drums of chemicals and

1180 tons of contaminated soil, at a cost of $552,000."4 When MB&T
6
refused to reimburse the EPA for cleanup costs, the EPA sued.'
At trial, MB&T raised the "third party defense,"14 7 and moved for

summary judgment based upon the security interest exemption. ' 8 The
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,996.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
See, e.g., Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id at 575.

136. 632 F, Supp. 573.
Id
Id
Id
Id
ld

Id
Id
Id at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id
Id. at 575.
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government also moved for summary judgment on the third party defense,
arguing that MB&T could not meet its burden of proof to assert the
defense. '4 The court denied both motions, finding that a factual dispute
existed on the issue of whether MB&T knew that hazardous substances
were dumped on the property."'
In determining whether the bank was an "owner," and thus liable
under the Act, the court focused upon the meaning of "owner."'' The court
concluded that when the bank purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale, its security interest ripened into full title. 5 2 Therefore, when cleanup
of the waste began approximately one year later, the bank held legal title
to the property. 53 The court further found that "[ojnly during the life of
the mortgage did MB&T hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect
its security interest in the land," and that MB&T purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale "not to protect its security interest, but to protect
its investment.""' The court also cited both Long Chemical and Mirabile
but distinguished Mirabile on the grounds that American Bank promptly
assigned the property in that case. 55 It also noted that the legislative history and policies behind the Act counseled against the Mirabile court's
"generous reading" of the security exemption.' 6 Therefore, MB&T was
liable as an "owner" under CERCLA1 5'
The court also noted several policy reasons for holding the bank liable."" It argued that if the federal government had to shoulder the entire
financial burden of the cleanup, the bank would be able to sell the land
at a profit and would benefit, at the government's expense, from the
increased value of the uncontaminated land."15 Thus, allowing the bank
to claim the security exemption would convert CERCLA into an "insurance scheme for financial institutions.' 0 6 0 The court also reasoned that
banks are easily able to protect themselves from CERCLA liability by
making prudent loans, by not foreclosing, and by not bidding at the foreclosure sale. 16
The most recent decision addressing the question of whether a lending institution may be liable under CERCLA is Tanglewood East
Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,Inc. 62 In Tanglewood, the Fifth Circuit
granted an interlocutory appeal to determine whether a bank could be lia149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id at 575, 581.
Id at 581-82.
Id. at 577. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.

Id
Id
Id at 580.

Id
Id at 579.
Id at 580.
Id
Id
Id; see also id at n.6.
849 F.2d 1568.
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ble for cleanup costs under CERCLA after financing a subdivision development located upon a former creosoting site.'
In Tanglewood, the United Creosoting Company operated a wood
treatment facility from 1946 to 1972 during which time toxic waste
accumulated on the property."" In 1973 several of the defendants, including contractors, real estate agents, and developers, purchased the
property, filled in and graded the areas where the creosote pools had been,
and began residential development." ' Contamination problems became
evident in 1980, and in 1983 the EPA placed the site on its National Priorities List." Residents of the subdivision then sued the real estate agents,
developers, construction companies, and the financing bank, under
CERCLA, for damages and cleanup of the subdivision. 67 The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss which the district court denied. 6 8 The lender,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Monroe (First Federal), then
sought an interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed." 9 The court held that the bank,
real estate agents, and developers could be classified as "past owners"
70
of the facility, and therefore could be strictly liable under the statute.
The court did not state, however, whether the basis for the ruling was
the bank's exercise of control, or whether it was based upon indicia of
ownership by some other means. The court also found that the filling in
and grading of the property may have constituted "disposal" or "treatment" of hazardous waste.' 7' The court therefore denied the motion to
each of the defendants could be held strictly liable
dismiss, finding that
72
for cleanup costs.'
ANALYSIS

In both Long Chemical and Mirabile,the courts interpreted the security interest exemption in accordance with the apparent plain language
of the Act, and in accord with the overall statutory scheme.'17 The Mirabile court recognized CERCLA's dual purpose to be that of cleaning up
the environment, and placing the costs of cleanup on "those who were
responsible for and profited from improper disposal practices.'"'7 Although
the court recognized that the bank could be liable as an owner if it participated in the management of the facility, it distinguished financial control from managerial control.' 8 The court held that the exercise of financial
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id, at 1576.
Id at 1571.
Id
Id

Id
Id.
Id at 1576.
Id, at 1572. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1).
Tanglewooa, 849 F.2d at 1573.
Id at 1575.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A). 42 U.S.C.A.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
Id at 20,995.

§ 9601(21).
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control over the debtor does not bring a lender within the scope of
CERCLA liability.'",
The MB&T and Tanglewood courts applied CERCLA more stringently
than did the Long Chemical and Mirabile courts. The Tanglewood court
simply followed the lead of MB&T, providing very little reasoning for its
decision. The MB&T court did, however, articulate what it considered to
be important policy reasons for refusing to allow the security interest
exemption.'" The court held that the bank foreclosed on the property "not
to protect its security interest, but to protect its investment." 78 Although
the distinction appears to be insignificant, the MB&T court, unlike the
Mirabile court, distinguished foreclosure from sale. 179 The court implied
that perhaps a lender could foreclose on property without exposing itself
to CERCLA liability. 8 ' However, once a bank purchases the property at
the foreclosure sale, it no longer acts to protect its security interest, but
becomes the legal owner of the property. The court suggested that rather
than foreclosing and purchasing at the foreclosure sale, a bank would be
well advised to exercise its other options which include not foreclosing,
and not bidding at the sale.' 81
The MB&T court also suggested that the length of time a lender holds
the property after the foreclosure sale might make a difference in whether
liability will be imposed.' 8' The court noted that in Mirabile the bank
promptly assigned the property to the Mirabiles. 88s In contrast, MB&T
held legal title for a full year before the EPA initiated cleanup."" The court
title for such length of time further solidisuggested that holding legal
5
fied the bank's ownership.8
Although the MB&T court did not expressly say so, it may have found
compelling policy considerations in favor of the deterrent effect of imposing liability on lending institutions. Attempts to clean up hazardous waste
after responsible parties have become insolvent, or disappeared altogether,
may be less effective than the preventative nature of tightening lending
procedures. Placing the burden of cleanup on lenders may very well force
lenders to originate loans with greater care. Producers of hazardous substances who are unable to obtain appropriate financing will be unable to
176. Id.
177. 632 F. Supp. at 580.
178. Id. at 579. The court noted that in Maryland, the mortgagee holds title to the
property until the mortgage is paid off. In other words, Maryland is a "title theory" state
rather than a "lien theory" state. Thus, the court reasoned that the exemption's purpose
was to exclude common law mortgagees from the definition of "owner" since title was in
their hands only by operation of the common law. Therefore, the exclusion should not apply
to mortgagees who hold title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. Id
179. Id
180. Id.
181. Id. at 580.
182. Id.
183. Id In Mirabile,the bank held legal title for approximately four months. 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. at 20,996.
184. Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
185. Id; see also id at n.5.
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pollute the atmosphere. The end result might well be more responsible
management of hazardous materials.
The Mirabile court did consider the deterrent effect of imposing liability on lenders. 186 It nevertheless determined that "Congress singled out
secured creditors for protection from liability under certain circumstances,' ' 87 and that imposing liability on secured lenders would not be
in accord with the overall scheme of the Act. 8 The court stated that "consideration of such policy matters, and the decision as to the imposition
of such liability . . . lies with Congress."" 9
Although the MB&T court contended that the legislative history and
policies underlying the Act supported its narrow construction of the security exemption, 90 the court failed to consider the dual purpose of
CERCLA. The court did consider the strong policy considerations in favor
of cleaning up the environment. 9 ' Nowhere in the opinion, however, did
the court consider the equally important policy of placing the costs of
cleanup on those parties who profit from the waste industry. 9
The MB&T and Tanglewood decisions suggest that courts are beginning to look beyond the obviously responsible parties to others who may
not necessarily be involved in the generation, production, or transportation of hazardous waste. Although courts have long recognized the liability of lending institutions for involvement in the control and management
of a borrower, imposing liability in the absence of control or management
is unique.
As the Mirabilecourt noted, imposing liability on lending institutions
would obviously enhance the government's chances of recovering its
cleanup costs.' 93 However, equally important is the goal that "responsible parties" shoulder that burden. The entire statutory scheme of the Act
attempts to place the costs of cleanup on those who manage or deal in
hazardous substances, and thereby profit from the industry. When Congress enacted CERCLA, it no doubt intended to create a broad liability
base; 194 however, Congress also recognized, by providing the security
interest exemption, that lenders and others who have little to do with the
every day operations of a hazardous waste facility, are seldom responsible for generating or transporting the waste, and should not be required
to bear the costs of cleanup. 9 When Congress added SARA to the Act,
186. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
187. Id.
188. Id at 20,995.
189. Id at 20,996.
190. 632 F. Supp. at 579.
191. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
193. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
194. See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, supra note 1, at 6136. "JAiny person who caused or contributed to a release or threatened release of hazardous waste into the environment which
results in costs being incurred. . would be strictly, jointly and severally liable for costs." Id
195. See id. at 6136-37. In order for liability to attach, "the plaintiff must demonstrate
a causal or contributory nexus between the acts of the defendant and the conditions which
" Id.
necessitated response action..
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it retained the security exemption. Apparently Congress believed, as late
as 1986, that lenders should be shielded from liability under CERCLA
as long as they did not participate in the management of the site. Creation of the "innocent landowner" exception further indicates Congress'
intent to allow an escape hatch for those who are not responsible for creating or magnifying hazardous waste problems.
As the number of hazardous waste sites increases throughout the
nation, so too will the number of loans secured by such sites. The result
is that lending institutions, which take collateral in the form of real estate
to secure a loan, become increasingly vulnerable to CERCLA liability.
Therefore, lenders must not only weigh the risks inherent in loan origination, but must also consider potential CERCLA liability, which may very
well exceed the value of the property.
Although some have suggested that the Justice Department, under
current policy, will not aggressively impose liability on a lender who forecloses and takes immediate steps to dispose of the property,""6 others have
disagreed.1 97 Speaking on the liability of lenders under CERCLA Gene A.
Lucero, Director of the Office of Waste Programs Enforcement at the EPA
in Washington D.C., recently stated:
Our objective is to clean up sites. Thus, we take broad, sometimes
ambiguous provisions of the law and constantly try to expand
them to further that end. In certain areas, the result is that potentially responsible parties will encounter considerable difficulty, in
a way that they might not now suspect.'98
In the same article Mr. Lucero further stated that "we hold lenders to
a higher standard than others.''199 However, he did not elaborate as to
why the higher standard.
Imposing liability on lenders will not only serve to increase lending
costs, but may preclude the funding of certain industries. Lenders will
of course be forced to pass the costs of environmental audits, on-site
inspections, and other precautionary measures onto borrowers. The result
will be increased loan origination costs, which will in turn reduce the operating capital available for the actual business venture. Requiring lenders
to finance hazardous waste cleanup will also increase the risk that a lender
must take in what may already be an uncertain lending transaction.
Considering current EPA policy it appears, particularly if other parties are insolvent, that lenders will continue to be the pocket from which
the EPA seeks to clean up much of the nation's waste. Although the Act
exempts from liability those who hold only a security interest in the
property, and although the statutory scheme appears to place the respon196. Schwenke, supra note 66, at 10,364.
197. McMahon, supra note 9, at 10,369.
198. Lucero, EPA's Role in and Perspectives on Property Transfer and FinancingLiabilities, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,366 (1988).
199. Id. at 10,367.
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sibility for cleanup on the parties who created the problem, courts may
continue to find strong policy reasons for spreading the costs of cleanup
over a broad range of parties.
PRECAUTIONS FOR LENDERS

Lenders should not wait until a borrower defaults on a loan, or until
foreclosure is pending, before taking measures to prevent the imposition
of costs under CERCLA. Lenders should anticipate problems which might
arise under CERCLA, and develop policies and procedures for originating loans which deal with those problems.
Whenever a lender originates a loan, he must also anticipate the need
to foreclose on the collateral at some later date. The greatest preventative measure that a lender can take, therefore, is to investigate properties to determine hazardous waste problems before making the loan. 00 At
that point the lender still has the option of denying the loan, if necessary,
and steering clear of the property altogether. Discovery of a hazardous
waste problem after the loan is made, or after foreclosure action is taken,
is not a defense under CERCLA. 201
Lenders should not simply rely upon the borrower's knowledge of past
or present uses of the property. Rather, lenders should do their own investigation to be sure that the property is being used as represented, and
that contamination problems do not exist on the property. Although
cleanup costs imposed under CERCLA might well become a lender's
greatest liability, the lender also takes an appreciable risk simply by loaning to businesses or industries which deal with hazardous waste. A borrower's noncompliance with federal and state environmental laws alone
may increase the risk which a lender takes. Fines, costs, or remedial measures imposed upon a borrower diminish his income or assets and thus
reduce his ability to repay the loan. The discovery of hazardous waste
on the property may also diminish the value of the property taken as collateral.
Lenders should request from borrowers certification that the borrower
has complied with all federal and state environmental laws and regulations. 22 They should also request representations as to the existence of
any lawsuits or administrative actions relating to environmental matters.203 A borrower's reluctance to provide such representations should
200. Scott, Addressing and Minimizing EnvironmentalRisks in Real Estate Transactions, HazardousWaste andAsbestos: Minimizing Risks and Solving Problems (Rothgerber,
Appel, Powers & Johnson in cooperation with CH2M Hill Engineers seminar materials), June
8, 1988 at 15. Although Scott directs his precautions towards purchasers of property, the
precautions are equally applicable to lenders in light of Superfund litigation. E.g., Maryland
State Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573.
201. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(35), 9607(a) and (b).
202. In order to assert the third party defense. (see supra notes 56 to 66 and accompanying text) one must undertake "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B).
203. Scott, supra note 200, at 15. See also, J. NORTON, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 9.12
(1987).
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immediately raise a red flag. The lender should also require the borrower
to indemnify him from liability arising from any environmental action
related to the property. 2 4 Although the indemnification may be of little
value if the borrower becomes insolvent, it may provide some protection
if the debtor brings an action against the lender. 0°
If a lender suspects the presence of hazardous waste, information
about the property may be obtained by conducting a title search to determine the chain of title, or by a search of tax records or aerial photographs.0 8 Because a title search may reveal little, however, an on-site
inspection may be necessary. 0 An on-site inspection should reveal any
visual signs of waste material. Things such as barrels, berms, fills, and
tanks raise an immediate signal as to the possible presence of hazardous
substances." ' Other signs that suggest the need for additional precautions include ponds, stained soil, industrial type buildings, and storage
facilities. 0 9 Less obvious signs which might indicate the presence of
hazardous substances include
odors, distressed vegetation, and indications
210
on neighboring lands.
If an on-site visit reveals the presence of hazardous substances, the
lender should require the borrower to provide an environmental audit
before loaning money on the property. The audit should include tests of
the soil, groundwater, and surface water. 211 Extensive inquiry into former
uses of the property and other precautionary measures, however, must
be done before the lender enters into a loan agreement with the borrower.
If a lender continues to involve himself in the operation of the business
after the parties enter into the loan agreement, or to monitor the use of
the real estate through follow-up audits or environmental assessments,
he may become an "owner" for exercising control over the borrower, and
thus become liable under CERCLA.
If a lender finds himself potentially liable for cleanup costs after he
has already entered into a loan transaction, and perhaps even after the
borrower is insolvent, he may wish to take affirmative steps to determine
liability for cleanup costs. Although no reported cases address such affirmative steps by a lender, certainly a lender could bring an action to recover
costs and to ask for a declaration as to liability. The action might not
absolve a lender of all liability; it would, however, force cleanup by the
responsible parties. Of course the EPA is unlikely to pursue less responsible parties as long as those primarily responsible are accessible and
remain solvent. Nevertheless, if no action is taken until after responsible
204. Scott, supra note 200, at 15. But see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e) (limits effectiveness of
indemnification agreements for persons liable under Act).
205. Scott, supra note 200, at 15.
206. Schwing, Site Investigation and Cleanup, Hazardous Waste andAsbestos: Minimizing Risks and Solving Problems (Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson in cooperation with
CH2M Hill Engineers seminar materials), June 8, 1988 at 32, 34.
207. Id.
208. Id- at 33-34.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id at 34.
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parties sell out or become insolvent, they will be unavailable to contribute to the cleanup, and a greater burden will be placed upon other parties.
A lender also has the options of not foreclosing, as the MB&T decision suggested," 2 or not foreclosing until after cleanup, or not purchasing at the foreclosure sale. If it appears that cleanup costs will exceed
the amount of the security interest, a lender might do well to write the
loan off. Such a decision, however, would be difficult if cleanup action had
not been initiated at the time of default.
CONCLUSION

Judicial interpretation of CERCLA indicates a trend by certain courts
which will probably continue in the future. That trend is to impose liability for cleanup costs, under CERCLA, upon those parties having some
connection with the contaminated property. Although a lender typically
has very little connection to the hazardous waste itself, foreclosing on a
security interest alone may be sufficient for a court to impose cleanup
costs. A tendency by the courts, as well as the EPA, to broadly construe
the definition of "owners and operators," and to narrowly construe the
exemptions and defenses, creates a greater risk for lenders. Therefore,
lenders should take precautions to reduce their exposure to liability, particularly when foreclosing on property subject to a security interest. The
lender who fails to recognize the possibility of liability under CERCLA,
and who fails to take adequate precautions to avoid that liability, may
find himself facing a large cleanup bill from the EPA.
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